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Abstract 
 
This Master’s thesis uncovers the discourse of the Georgian Orthodox Church 
(GOC) towards the European Union on two dimensions: the official discourse of 
the GOC and the ongoing discourse among its members (churchmen). The 
discourse analysis is applied as the methodological tool. In order to find the official 
discourse, statements of the GOC and its Head Patriarch Ilia II are analyzed. For 
the identification of the internal discourse the GOC members are interviewed about 
the topical issues related to the Europeanization of Georgia. Theoretical basis of 
this research project is formed by analysis of the literature on Normative Power 
Europe, the role of religion in politics and Constructivism. Empirical data clarify 
that the general discourse of the GOC is pro-EU, although the internal discourse is 
heterogeneous and varies between pro-EU and pro-Russian narratives. Based on the 
interview results, this thesis also suggests the methodological approach for the 
future research to the in-depth study of the internal discourse of the GOC.  
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Introduction 
Georgia and the European Union (EU) are expanding and forging their 
relations. After signing the Association Agreement, including the agreement on the 
deep and comprehensive free trade area, Georgia anticipates granting of visa 
liberalization, which will be the next step in deepening of its European integration.  
It should be noted that the results of the public opinion polls show support of 
the Georgian society to the foreign policy of the government towards Georgia’s 
membership in the European family (National Democratic Institute, 2016). 
Nevertheless, in academic sphere, it is argued that on the way of Europeanization 
Georgia faces an obstacle coming from the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). This 
is the institution which is followed by approximately 84% of Georgians (National 
Statistic office of Georgia, 2014, p. 8)  and the level of trust to the GOC is as high 
as 91% (Baltic Surveys/The Gallup, 2015) within the Georgian society.  
In academic discussions the GOC is  described as having negative attitude 
towards the issues of the European integration (Kapanadze, 2015, p. 177) and as 
being the soft power tool of the Russian Federation (Kakabadze, 2015, p. 4).1 In 
addition, according to Chitanava (2015), the GOC expresses pro-Russian 
sentiments emphasizing that Georgia and Russia have the ‘same-faith. The 
discourse is about the importance of “traditional orthodox values” and “traditional 
families”, for which the acceptance of the Western values will be an existential 
threat. 
Even though these authors present the GOC as an anti-European2 institution 
in Georgia, their assessment leaves the room for skepticism, because the statements 
of the Patriarch of Georgia and the other members of the GOC show that the GOC 
articulates pro-European stance. The most vivid example is the commercial on the 
official TV channel of the GOC where the Patriarch Illia II expresses support of the 
GOC on the way of Georgia’s European integration with the following statement: 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that this thesis does not aim to research whether or not the GOC represents the 
soft power tool of the Russian Federation. This is just one of the examples how the GOC is 
described in the academic sphere by one of the scholars.  
2 In the thesis anti/pro-European is used as pro/anti-EU. In addition, European means the EU. 
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“The European Union is a well-known organization for Georgian people and we 
are doing everything to become a full member of this big organization. I would like 
to assure you that Georgian Orthodox Church will do everything for realizing this 
idea” (TV channel of the GOC - Unanimity, 2016). At the same time, the above-
mentioned authors emphasize that the GOC is anti-European institution. Therefore, 
such mutually exclusive messages make it harder to uncover what kind of discourse 
is articulated by the GOC and among its members.  
The past experience shows that the GOC is able to form public opinion and 
resist the government in adopting particular laws. For example, there was a huge 
discussion about adoption of the law concerning to the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination. The same happened in case of the law on local self-government. In 
addition, demonstration evaluated in mass media as led by priests on 17th of May 
for hindering another demonstration related to the celebration of international day 
against homophobia, transphobia and biphobia, has made it clear how influential 
the GOC is within the Georgian society. As the level of confidence in the Patriarch 
Illia II and the GOC itself is high, they can turn their societal power into the political 
one and impact on the decision-making of the government. From this logic, it can 
be argued that the study of the GOC discourse has critical importance.  
Considering that the research is about the religious institution and its 
discourse, in the theoretical part, the role of religion in the international relations 
will be reviewed. 
As the major part of the GOC discourse is about the value struggle and 
normative difference within the society, this study employs constructivism as a 
theoretical framework, which “is about human consciousness and its role in 
international life” (Ruggie 1998, p.856 as cited in Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 
392).  As a socio-analytical approach, constructivism claims that:  
 ideational factors form the human interaction; 
 the most significant ideational aspects are broadly shared within the society 
and these aspects cannot be narrowed to individuals; 
 international actors’ interests are based on these shared beliefs; (Finnemore 
& Sikkink, 2001, p. 392) 
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In addition, this research also uses Manner’s notion of Normative Power 
Europe (NPE). Manners (2002) applies a new approach to identify the EU’s role in 
the international system. His concept of normative power makes completely new 
viewpoint about the international identity of the EU by distancing from the pre-
existing approaches focusing on the material gain and/or military purposes. 
According to Manners, the most significant aspect in shaping the role of the EU is 
not “what it does or what it says, but what it is”. The EU represents the normative 
power based on the treaties, agreements and etc. which also binds the EU itself. 
Therefore, these conditions make the EU act in a normative way, in accordance 
with the values and principles recognized internationally even if its actions 
negatively affect on its own strategic interests (Manners, 2002, p. 252; Diez & 
Manners, 2007, p. 175). 
It should be noted that the concept – normative power Europe has generated 
a debate in the academic field and, according to various assumptions, its validity 
has become questionable. However, scholars agree that the EU definitely represents 
a normative power for the countries aspiring the EU membership (see for example 
Larsen, 2014; Diez, 2005).  
As the role of religion is increased in international politics, Larsen (2014) 
underlines that the religious discursive context represents an important aspect in 
studying of the EU as a normative power. His contribution will be further discussed 
in the theoretical part of the paper. 
For the purpose of this research the following questions are important to be 
answered: What kind of discourse the GOC has towards the EU? What kind of 
discourse prevails in the GOC towards the EU?   
The thesis will study and analyze the discourse of the GOC towards the EU 
and the discourse dominated among the GOC members with regard to the EU. In 
order to answer the research questions qualitative research method will be applied. 
In particular, discourse analysis of the statements, speeches and interviews of the 
Patriarch Illia II, also the official statements of the Patriarchate of Georgia will be 
used to answer the first research question. As for the second one, interviews will be 
conducted with the members of the Georgian Orthodox Church.  
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It should be noted that in his statements directed to the internal audience – the 
Archbishop of Athens and All Greece and the primate of the Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church of Greece – Christodoulos emphasized the EU as the threat 
because for him this institution represented the source of moral degradation. But in 
case of the statements directed to the external audience, the Archbishop of Athens 
was more cautious and tried to avoid criticism of the EU (Tsuladze, et al., 2016, p. 
153). It can be assumed that the GOC has the similar stance and having the pro-EU 
position does not exclude the possibility to have the pro-Russian sentiments. 
Nevertheless, in order to depict the full picture, in the thesis, besides studying the 
nature of the discourse of the GOC towards the EU, the statements of the Patriarch 
Ilia II labelled as the examples of pro-Russian attitude will also be reviewed. Thus, 
the answers of the research questions might be that the GOC has both pro-EU and 
pro-Russian discourses. The same applies to the discourses, prevailing within the 
GOC members, which will be revealed based on the interviews.  
  The main limit of this thesis is the probability from the potential 
interviewers of denying the participation in the interviews, thus it will be 
challenging to identify the prevailing discourse in the members of the GOC towards 
the EU in a comprehensive way. In addition, the interviewees might avoid giving 
sincere answers to the sensitive questions which is why the questionnaire contains 
carefully formulated controlling questions as well. 
 The outcome of this thesis will make a contribution in understanding of the 
connection between the religious institution and normative power Europe. Based 
on the case study, it is expected that the interviews will uncover previously 
unobserved discourses of the GOC members and it will be possible to see if the 
GOC really represents an obstacle for the European integration of Georgia. 
In order to reach the objectives and answer the research questions, 
structurally, the thesis is divided in five main parts. 
In the first chapter, the reviews of the literature about the role of religion in 
International Relations, the theory of constructivism, and one of the approaches 
related to the EU’s international identity -  Normative Power Europe are provided. 
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The second chapter outlines the methodological tools applied in this research, 
in particular, discourse analysis and one of its dimensions - discursive psychology. 
This section of the thesis also provides information about the choice of sample for 
the interview. 
After providing the methodological outline, the focus of the thesis shifts to 
the empirical section divided in three main parts.  
 The first chapter of the empirical data is devoted to the illustration of the 
examples which reveal the influence of the GOC over the politics in Georgia.  
 The next chapter of the thesis, is about the discourse of the GOC, and is 
divided in three subchapters. The first subchapter reviews the discourse of the GOC 
towards the EU. As for the second one, examples of the GOC statements labelled 
as the expression of pro-Russian attitudes in media sources and academic papers 
will be shown. The final subsection of this chapter summarizes the results of 
analysis about the nature of the discourse articulated by the GOC towards the EU.  
 The last main chapter of the dissertation outlines the results of the interviews 
conducted with the members of the GOC, and is followed by four subdivisions. 
Before analyzing the interviews, description of the respondents and the brief outline 
of the questionnaire are provided. After that, analysis of the interview results is 
conducted, which gives the opportunity to uncover the ongoing discourse of the 
GOC members towards the EU. In the end of this chapter, overall results of the 
interviews are summarized.  
 The research ends by providing the final conclusions after reiterating the 
initial aim of the thesis and the way of its implementation. It also outlines main 
findings of the analysis and clarifies the way the research objectives have been 
reached.  
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Theoretical Framework 
Role of Religion in International Relations 
Historically, religion has been playing a considerable role in international 
relations. Religious factors determined the actions of the empires and in many cases 
wars broke out based on religious grounds.  
The 17th century can be evaluated as the turning point since when the 
separation of politics and religion has started. In particular, in 1648, the Peace of 
Westphalia was signed which ended the Thirty Years War which had religious 
motives. While the religion was discussed as the reason for violence, wars and 
bloodshed, the European nation-states made the shift towards adoption of the 
secular norms and recognized them on the state level. (Lynch, 2014, pp. 278-279).  
Since religion was assessed as the causal reason of ferocity, the study of the 
religion and its role in IR was not perceived as rational. Since then, in the Western 
world, the state has become the main focus of IR studies while the role of religion 
diminished (Sandal & James, 2010, pp. 5-6). 
Spreading of the secular and liberal values made religious rules and their 
influence on politics insignificant again. If before, the religious institutions had an 
influential role on political life and in IR, by the middle of 20th century, the 
influence of religious rules were not significant, neither at national nor at 
international political levels (Aguilar, 2006, pp. 316-317).  
Nevertheless, soon, the role of religion has become again an influential factor 
in IR. According to Lynch (2014), the end of the cold war and the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks created fertile ground for re-emergence of religious factors in shaping the 
political actions.  
The re-appearance of religion in IR was centered again to the violent actions, 
such as religiously and ethnically inspired conflicts in Central Asia and Balkans. 
Moreover, in 1992 Samuel Huntington proposed the idea of ‘The Clash of 
Civilizations’, claiming that the next large scale conflict would be among 
civilizations based on the religious grounds (Lynch, 2014, p. 285).  
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According to Thomas, “bringing culture and religion back into IR is part of a 
wider effort to bring ideas, values, and more broadly, ideational factors back in ’to 
the study of IR” (Thomas, 2005, p. 69). 
In contemporary International Relations, scholars agree that religion matters 
in politics and religious factor is recognized as a significant element of conflicts 
and conflict resolution mechanisms (Sheikh, 2012, p. 365).  
According to Sheikh, religion has influence over the issues which are 
important for the study of IR. For example, religion impacts on the “behavior and 
foreign policies, the conditions of peace, order and security, and not least the 
outbreak of war.” (Sheikh, 2012, p. 373) 
Fox argues that religion has influence over the political actors in the following 
three ways: “First, foreign policies are influenced by the religious views and beliefs 
of policymakers and their constituents. Second, religion is a source of legitimacy 
for both supporting and criticizing government behavior locally and internationally. 
Third, many local religious issues and phenomena, including religious conflicts, 
spread across borders or otherwise become international issues.” (Fox, 2001, p. 59) 
According to Sheikh, “if religion has ever been silent in world-political 
matters, it is increasingly clear that religion will be speaking in this century, not 
only to the departments of theology or religious studies, but perhaps more loudly, 
to the departments of IR” (Sheikh, 2012, p. 392). 
If the religious influence and its role in IR is no longer controversy among 
scholars, the definition of religion is quite debatable. Philpott claims that “religion 
is a set of beliefs about the ultimate ground of existence, which is unconditioned, 
not itself created or caused” (Philpott, 2002, p. 68). In addition, he argues that 
ideologies have influence over people, determine their behaviors and in some cases, 
motivate them to proceed bloodshed. But, ideologies differ from religion in the 
sense that they are not about ‘the ultimate ground of existence’ (Bosco, 2009, p. 
94).  
According to Hanson’s definition, religion is the “pattern of beliefs and 
activities that expresses ultimate meaning in a person’s life” (Hanson, 2006, p.71; 
as reffered in Bosco, 2009, p. 94). If Philpott (2002) differs ideologies and religion, 
13 
 
based on the latter definition, religion and ideologies do not differ from each other 
as they all can depict ‘the ultimate meaning in a person’s life’ (Hanson, 2006, p.73; 
as referred in Bosco, 2009, p. 95). 
 Generally, the major debate about the definition of religion is between 
funciolaists and substantialist views. According to functionalist approach, since 
religion and other ideologies, such as nationalism, marxism and etc., have common 
characteristics, they are comparable. The major focus on the study of religion is 
about its function, in particular, capability of religion in producing psychologycal, 
sociological or economic outcomes (effects). As for the substantialist point of view, 
religion is studied as beliefs, practicies, institutions, prayers, churches and rituals. 
Followers of this approach claim that religion should not be compared to other 
sociocultural phenomena and, from this logic, they criticize the advocates of 
functionalist approach. (Sheikh, 2012, pp. 371-372)  
 Unlike the above mentioned scholars, Fox and Sandrel  (2006) agree on the 
point of view of Brian Turner, who calims that definition of religion is exceedingly 
difficult. Rather than trying to define what religion is, Fox and Sandler accept the 
statement that religion has influence and determins the behavoir of humman. In 
addition, they claim that it is better to have focus on what religion does and not on 
what it is. From this logic, it will be easier to avoid the challenging discussion about 
the definition of religion and to pay the attention to the principal matters of the 
social sciences, actvities of humans, which in some cases are based on religious 
beliefs. (Bosco, 2009, p. 98)  
 This suggestion is supported in this research and instead of applying the 
definiton of religion, it is accpeted that the GOC has influence over the society. 
Thus, it is interesting what the GOC does, in particular, what kind of discourse it 
has towards the GOC. As it is argued above, the legitimacy of accepting and 
supporting or rejecting and critically assesing the actions of the government, comes 
from religion and if the GOC has negative attitudes towards the EU, with the high 
probability it will affect on the EU image-creation within the Georgian society.  
 Regarding the religious influence and Europeanization, for example, in 
Poland, “the discourse of the Pope John Paul II about the pro-EU choice had a 
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positive influence over the society. It should be noted that in statistical terms, 
connecton between religious engagement and pro-EU attitudes has never been 
confirmed. Although, the statements of the Pope, on the one hand, decreased the 
frequency of the anti-EU claims form the representatives of the Polish Catholic 
Church, but, on the other hand, the Pope’s statements strongly influenced the 
discourse of the anti-EU TV channels” (Tsuladze, et al., 2016, pp. 152-153). From 
this logic, the attitudes of the GOC about the Georgia’s pro-EU choice are 
interesting for examination. 
Constructivism in International Relations 
Constructivism is about studying social relations. It is completely different 
from the “materialistic” approach in explaining the nature of international reality. 
If, for instance, neorealism and neoliberalism emphasize the significance of 
material capabilities and military forces as the constitutive of  the concept of 
“power” which itself is one of the most important factors in studying the 
international politics (Hurd, 2008, p. 300), constructivism draws an attention to, for 
example: the role of culture, knowledge and ideas in shaping the nature of 
international reality. (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 391). The shared ideas and 
assumptions among people represent ‘intersubjectivity’, which is the core 
ideational element for the constructivists (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 166).  
According to constructivism, existing reality is not a given condition by 
nature, on the contrary, human beings are the main aspects of the social and political 
world constructed based on their understanding (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, pp. 
162-164). The authors state that constructivism includes aspects of social theory 
and also some fundamental theories of IR.  Adler (1997) argues that in the theories 
about international relations, constructivism takes the middle stance between 
interpretive and rationalist approaches and offers new dimensions for empirical and 
theoretical examination. Furthermore, the author claims that constructivist 
approach is an effort of building a connection link between idealist and positivist 
philosophies of social science (Adler, 1997, p. 323). Therefore, this theoretical 
approach does not stand alone and exist independently from other approaches, on 
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the contrary, constructivism is built on the other disciplines and represents the 
synthesis of them.  
Onuf (1989) applies the viewpoints of international law in order to explain 
the influence of persuasion and the rule-based conduct in international relations. 
For this study, rule-based behavior represents an important aspect, which will be 
discussed below in further details.  
According to Onuf (1998), people are made based on the social reality, which 
itself is created by people. The society and people make each other and the nature 
of their relation can be described as an ongoing process, where the rules are the 
connecting link between these two components. On their behalf, the rules make it 
obvious what should be and should not be done, what can be the consequences of 
breaking the rule and etc. People’s attitude towards the rules shapes practices. In 
other words, practices are the results of human interaction, who on their behalf act 
based on their own beliefs, ideas and understanding (Adler, 1997, p. 325). In 
addition, rules specify the active members of the society, which may be called 
agents. Moreover, the rules clarify in which situations and to what extent who is an 
agent (Onuf, 1998, p. 59).  Practices and rules together, form the patterns, named 
as institutions. The activity of agents sometimes is followed by unintended 
consequences and in that way, all these above-mentioned aspects compose structure 
of a particular society (Onuf, 1998, pp. 60-61).  
In regard of the theories of international relations, Cox separates theories as 
‘critical’ and ‘problem solving.’ From this perspective, constructivism can be 
viewed as both. “It is critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing 
order of the world and asks how the order came about. But it is also ‘problem-
solving’, in the sense that, once institutions and practices are reified, ‘it takes the 
world as it finds it . . . as the given framework for action”. (Cox, 1986: 208–9, as 
cited in Adler, 1997, p. 334) 
The theories of international relations discuss the aspects shaping actors’ 
national interests, policy directives and etc. Thus, it can be described as the 
mundane method of acting in international arena in order to get worldly outcomes. 
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In case of the religion, in particular the Orthodox religion, rules and tenets show 
how to live for getting otherworldly outcomes.  
Finnemore claims that international norms supported by the international 
organizations can affect the states and finally make them to adopt these norms in 
their nationwide strategies (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 170). This argument may 
not be valid when it comes to the state where religious institution has high level of 
reliability. From constructivists logic, agents have a desire to achieve goals and 
these goals shows the needs of people. (Onuf, 1998, p. 60) As the rules are created 
by people and as the majority of the population in Georgia is Christian orthodox, it 
is not surprising if their rule-based behavior is coming from orthodox culture. 
According to constructivism, agents’ actions have influence over each other. In this 
regard, the action of the GOC may have influence over the state authority. Therefore 
rule-based conduct of Orthodox believers on a national level will affect over the 
government’s policy and if the GOC truly represents an anti-Western institution in 
Georgia, the study of its discourse is important in the sense that the followers of the 
GOC may as well share their attitudes towards the Georgia – EU cooperation, and 
this can be the ground for modification of Georgian foreign policy.  
The Concept of Normative Power Europe 
In the social sciences, the phenomena can be explained from different 
viewpoints. Theories and approaches are used to elucidate the essence of 
international actors, the ways they act worldwide and the reasons why, how and 
under what circumstances different policy measures are implemented.  
While evaluating the European Union as a political entity, it is emphasized 
that the mixture of supranational and international approaches of governance makes 
the EU a different actor on international level, which can be described as “beyond 
to Westphalian principles.” (King, 1999, as refered in Manners, 2002) 
International actorness, capabilities to acquire and exercise power and the 
forms of influence the EU has are examined in various ways. For instance, Duchene 
(1972, 1973) described the EU as a Civilian Power, while Bull (1982) emphasized 
the significance of military power.  
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In 2002, Manners elaborated the new approach to understand the international 
identity of the EU - the Normative Power Europe, emphasizing that the EU 
implements its actions in relation with its member states, and also with the rest of 
international actors, in accordance with the universal values and principles. In 
addition, the EU’s normative foundation makes it a political entity which is vastly 
different from actors, and as Manners states, the concept of ‘Normative Power 
Europe’ claims to neglect ‘Westphalian’ principles. (Manners, 2002, p. 239) 
All actors have their own norms and interest in the international relations, but 
the distinctiveness of the EU’s normative basis stands on its “historical context, 
hybrid polity and political-legal constitution” (Manners, Normative Power Europe: 
A Contradiction In Terms?, 2002, p. 240). According to Manners, the purpose of 
the EU’s actions is not material gain (Manners, Normative Power Europe: A 
Contradiction In Terms?, 2002, p. 253). Moreover, it should be emphasized that 
even when the normative foundation of the EU is in contrast to its material interests, 
this institution still takes measures in accordance with the universal values and 
principles (Diez & Manners, 2007, p. 175). Therefore, in compliance with its 
normative basis, the EU has acquired to shape what is normal in international 
relations.  Keene refers that “an essential dimension of Normative Power Europe is 
the EU’s ability to construct for itself an international identity that embodies a 
highly distinctive way of being in the world, of organizing both domestic political 
systems and relations between states” (Keene, Social status, social closure and the 
idea of Europe as a 'normative power', 2012, p. 949). 
The new theoretical concept has raised numerous questions and has caused 
ongoing debate about whether or not the EU is a normative power, why it is a 
normative power, how it is different from other political actors and why some actors 
perceive the EU as a normative power, while others attribute to it another type of 
power. 
According to Diez (2005), the concepts of ‘normative and civilian power’ are 
not distinct from each other, on the contrary, Diez claims that ‘normative power’ is 
the part of ‘civilian power’, while the latter also represents and specifies “particular 
kind of ‘normative power’” (Diez, 2005, p. 635).  
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In response to the criticism of Diez, Manners refers to the reasons which 
differentiate ‘normative power’ from ‘civilian power.’ The latter notion emphasizes 
the importance of economic power, national strategies and/or interests, in addition, 
‘civilian means’ are employed in favor of the one who implements them; while the 
former concept claims that the EU has no material aims, acts not necessarily based 
on its own interests and norms but in a cosmopolitan way (Manners, 2006, p. 176). 
Moreover, “the Normative Power thesis is an attempt to escape civilizing missions 
by countering the neocolonial discourses of claims implicit (or explicit) in civilian 
power” (Manners, 2006, p. 175).  
Unlike Diez, who stressed attention on the similarities of ‘civilian’ and 
‘normative’ powers, Larsen (2014) and Forsberg (2011) put an emphasize on the 
importance of subjective and objective understanding of the EU as a ‘normative 
power.’ Larsen reviews the researches related to the external perceptions of the 
‘Normative Power Europe’ in different geographical areas. According to the results 
of the research projects analyzed by Larsen, it is clear that the EU is not commonly 
accepted as a ‘normative power’ and the characteristics attributed to the EU vary in 
different parts of the world (Larsen H. , 2014, pp. 902-904) . 
Keene (2012) tries to figure out, what makes the EU the ‘normative power’ 
and uses subjective rather than objective understanding.  All actors have norms and 
values but they do not make those actors ‘Normative Powers’. In order to analyze 
the concept of ‘normative power’ in a more comprehensive way, Keene puts an 
emphasis on social, political and moral aspects of ‘normative power.’ 
First of all, for promotion of own values, they should be morally reasonable, 
rationally and logically valid, subsequently these factors will make the potential 
recipients eager to absorb new values. In case of political aspect, the ability of 
persuasion is significant, and it should be supported by technical expert knowledge, 
otherwise persuasion would not be enough for the acquisition political advantage. 
(Keene, 2012, pp. 943-944) 
In order to clarify social aspect of ‘normative power’ Keene applies to 
Weber’s method of “class, status, party” (Weber 1968, as referred in Keene, 2012, 
p. 945). In regard to the EU, ‘class’ indicates to material resources, while ‘status’ 
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points to the specific lifestyle, as for the ‘party’, Keene presents the EU as a 
‘beaurocatic power’, but without further elabroation of its meaning (Keene, Social 
status, social closure and the idea of Europe as a 'normative power', 2012, pp. 945-
947). The social element of ‘normative power’ is counted as curcial as it clarifies 
that, eventually, ‘normative power’ of the EU “depends on its ability to establish 
itself as a prestigious, high-status actor in international politics” (Keene, Social 
status, social closure and the idea of Europe as a 'normative power', 2012, p. 949).  
Manners (2002) refers to the EU as a normative power, but without precise 
explanation of the words ‘normative’ and ‘power.’ Instead of explaining what 
‘normative’ means, Manners points out core norms – peace, human rights, liberty, 
the rule of law and democracy, coming from the treaties and declarations. In 
addition, four secondary norms, such as – sustainable development, anti-
dsicrimination, social solidarity and good governance, are elaborated (Manners, 
2002, pp. 242-243).  
Forsberg (2011) reviews two types in understanding of norm. On the one hand 
“‘norm’ is usually defined as a principle of right action that can be approached from 
various ethical perspectives” (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1190), and on the other hand, 
‘norm’ refers to ‘being normal’, which does not necessaritly refers to the positive 
understaning of acting normatively. ‘Being normal’ depends on the context: 
international actors have different norms and they are able to act normatively 
according to their own understanding which may contradict the first definiton of 
acting as a normative power (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1190).    
In regard to the notion of ‘power’, in the international relations explaining the 
power in different concepts is critically important (Guzzini, 2005 , p. 508), 
although, in his seminal article, Manners is not explicit in defining power he 
provides the tools how the ‘normative power’ is exercised. The following ways are 
used by the EU for spreading its norms: 
 Informational diffusion -  through declaratory and strategic 
communication; 
 Transference – includes trade relations, which also involves financial aid 
and/ or imposition of sanctions; 
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 Contagion – expansion of norms and ideas in an unintentional way; 
 Overt diffusion - the EU is physically presented in the third actor, state or 
organization and etc.; 
 Procedural diffusion – through regulation of relationships with third 
parties; 
 Cultural filter – promotion of the norms, for instance, human right issues 
and democratic values. 
In addition to these methods for exercising the ‘normative power,’ Manners 
stated that the ‘normative power’ represents the power of ideas and the central part 
of this theoretical concept is “the power of ideas of the comon good” (Manners, 
2009, p. 562) where the ‘commong good’ means “general wellbeing shared by all 
members of a scoiety” (Manners, 2009, p. 563). 
Larsen (2014) points on the characteristics of ‘soft power’ and ‘normative 
power.’ Despite the fact that both of them, to some extent, share common features, 
Manners mentions that normative power is a theoretical concept, which involves 
the necessity to perceive normative practice and social diffusion, while the ‘soft 
power’ is an empirical concept related to the debate regarding the power of the US 
(Diez and Manners, 2007, as referred in Forsberg, 2011, p. 1195).  
Even though ‘normative power’ stands on the power of ideas (Manners, 2009, 
p. 570), it still leaves the space for employing military means, but one condition 
should be satisfied: “military power (...) should be (...) subordinated to the more 
fundamental normative ethos” (Diez & Manners, 2007, p. 187). 
On the basis of the fact that the ‘normative power Europe’ has nothing in 
common with Westphalian understanding of power, Keene indicates that 
‘normative power’ represents “an innovative move in evaluating and classifying 
powers” (Keene, 2013, p. 277). 
Forsberg (2011) suggests four mechanisms – persuasion, invoking norms, 
shaping discourse and the power of example for exercising of ‘normative power 
Europe.’ (Forsberg, 2011, pp. 1196-1197). In addition, he indicates some of the 
norm diffusion mechanisms, which are incompatible with the idea of ‘normative 
21 
 
power Europe.’ For example, according to Manners, ‘transference’ includes the use 
of the economic means while expanding norms and values, hence, it can be 
identified as a form of economic power rather than normative; as for the ‘overt 
diffusion,’ it happens when the EU is physically presented in the third country but 
it is not elaborated whether the above-mentioned mechanism is distinct or it is an 
efficient way to disseminate information and to persuade others (Forsberg, 2011, p. 
1196).  
Some scholars refer to the literature which certify that the EU is not seen as a 
normative power in different geographical areas. For instance, to some extent, the 
EU is viewed as ‘normative power’ in Africa and also in the part of Asia, while the 
states as Russia, India, China and etc. do not perceive the EU as a ‘normative 
power’; Moreover, in relations with the above-mentioned states, economic interests 
prevail (Larsen, 2014, p. 903, see also Forsberg, 2011, p. 1194). Nebertheless, an 
important geographical exception should be emphasized. Researches make it 
obvious, that in case of the following countries – Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, the EU’s normative agenda is viewed in a positive manner 
and the EU is most likely able to ‘shape conception what is normal.’ (Larsen, 2014, 
p. 904; see also Diez, 2005, p. 616). In regard to the above-mentioned international 
actors, the context is that they are deepening their relations with the EU and some 
of them even strive to become full members of the European Union after meeting 
the requirements stipulated by the EU, for instance, Copenhagen criteria. Therefore, 
it is not fortuitous that the EU is viewed as a normative power in the recently 
mentioned countries.    
Manners refers that “normative power is a discursive formation that relies on 
legitimacy, coherence, and voluntarism for its influence” (Manners, 2009, p. 570). 
Although, as Larsen (2014) mentions, Manners did not discuss the importance of 
discursive context while evaluating the EU as a normative power. Since “the 
politics of religion represents an important area of study, and the role of religion in 
international politics is widely seen as being increased during the last 10–20 years”, 
Larsen argues that it is significant to study the religious discursive context while 
evaluating the EU as a normative power.  
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Larsen (2014) focuses on the study of the NPE from the external perception. 
It is argued that the NPE is not something that the EU has as ‘taken for granted’, 
but the external perception has the vital importance in this context. It is necessary 
precondition for the NPE to be taken by the local actors, otherwise the EU’s identity 
as a normative power will become questionable.  
In case of the current research, it is the fact that the main foreign policy aim 
of the Georgian government is the full membership of the EU. From this logic, it 
can be argued that the authorities accept the EU as a normative power and strive to 
meet the requirements of the EU. Besides the political elite, the aspects of the NPE 
should be attracted by the society, and since the GOC is more popular and reliable 
institution than the government within the Georgian society, the EU also needs to 
be trusted by the GOC. The reliability level can be positively affected by the 
seminars for the members of the GOC organized by the government. This is what 
happens in Georgia, the government in cooperation with the NGOs organizes the 
seminars about the EU-Georgia relations for the members of the GOC in different 
parts of the country (see for example (Odishi.ge, 2015) (Center for Development 
and Democracy, 2015)).  
Moreover, besides the Georgian government, the EU also perceives the GOC 
as an important actor and its clear demonstration was the meeting about the 
importance of Georgia’s Europeanization between the representatives of the GOC 
(the official delegation) and the EU in Brussels in November 2016 (Center for 
Development and Democracy, 2016). 
These examples clearly demonstrate how much not just the Georgian 
government but also the EU value the role of the GOC in creating the positive image 
of the EU integration. Thus, the GOC can be identified as an important actor in 
strengthening the EU normative power. 
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Methodology 
Discourse Analysis 
The following study applies the qualitative research method, in particular, 
discourse analysis. Discourse is “a particular way of talking about and 
understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, 
p. 1). Discourse analysis is separated into various types explaining the social 
phenomena from different viewpoints and they have the methodological approach 
typical to each of them for studying and analyzing the empirical data. It should be 
noted that discourse analysis does not represent a stand-alone technique, rather it is 
a collection of interdisciplinary methods for investigating the particular social 
realm. This approach claims “that language is structured according to different 
patterns that people’s utterances follow when they take part in different domains of 
social”, [...] and [...] “‘discourse analysis’ is the analysis of these patterns 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1).  
Generally, types of discourse analysis such as critical discourse analysis, 
poststructuralist discourse analysis and discourse psychology are based on social 
constructionism, the theory which critically looks at the knowledge as the taken-
for-granted phenomenon. From this respect, the world does not exist itself, but it is 
created through the discourse of human beings; in addition, this approach claims 
that social interactions form knowledge, and people’s understanding of social 
reality is created through social processes. 
These claims are quite similar to Onuf’s description of agents, patterns and, 
in general, how the world is constructed. Therefore, social constructionism and 
social constructivism have common features, and it can be argued that the above-
mentioned discourse methods are appropriate for both.  
Jørgensen & Phillips clarify that the types of discourse analysis share some 
core assumptions. For instance, all of them state that people’s thoughts, actions and 
perceptions play a crucial role in creating the world as it is. In addition, all of them 
apply critical research. But, at the same time, they have features which completely 
differ from each other’s approach, such as the selection of data for the analysis and 
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the way the individual is perceived in a particular discourse method. For example, 
poststructuralism discusses an individual as a subject of analysis, while discourse 
psychology perceives it as a producer and a product of discourse (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2002, p. 7). 
The point of departure for discourse analytical approaches is the study of 
language, which makes it available for human being to have an access to the social 
reality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 8). As the focus of this thesis is the 
identification of the discourse of the GOC towards the EU, the discursive 
psychology will be employed as a methodological tool. 
According to discourse psychology, socially constituted world does not 
exclude the existence of material feature. On the contrary, physical reality exists 
outside the discourse but the meaning of physical reality is discursively created 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 103). To simplify, in the context of this research 
project, the EU as an institution does exist physically, but, the perception and/or the 
meaning of the EU for the GOC is the product of its discursive practice.  
Discourse psychology argues that the ways people perceive the world vastly 
depend on historical and social factors (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 99). In this 
thesis, the unit of analysis is the perception of the EU which, according to the logic 
of Jørgensen & Phillips, also depends on social and historical factors taking place 
in Georgia. From historical factor, the orthodox church has always had an important 
role in Georgian history. As for the social factor, as it is already mentioned, absolute 
majority of the Georgian population is Orthodox.  
Data Sampling 
The main issues, on which the GOC and the government expressed 
conflicting positions, were related to the adoption of the law about the elimination 
of all forms of discrimination, the law on local self-government and the plan of the 
Ministry of Education of Georgia about introducing the new subject at school – “I 
and Society”. In addition to these concerns, the GOC was labeled as organizing the 
anti-LGBT demonstration, and consequently, restricting the freedom of expression 
for the minority group celebrating the 17th of May in 2013.  
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The following paragraph will explain why all of these issues are connected to 
the EU and important to be included in this research.  
Within the framework of the roadmap to visa liberalization for Georgia, the 
Georgian government was responsible to adopt the law about the elimination of all 
forms of discrimination (Transparency International - Georgia, 2014). As for the 
law about the local self-government, it was initiated in order to deepen democratic 
process and promote good governance. The concept of good governance can be 
counted as the value of the EU, consisting the following five principles as its basis: 
openness, accountability, coherence, effectiveness and participation (European 
Commission, 2001). The Minister of Infrastructure and Sustainable Development 
of Georgia argued that the new law on local self-government “will give us different 
self-government” [...] and [...] “only under such circumstances will it become 
possible to effectively manage services and to carry out actual decentralization” 
(Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure of Georgia).  
In case of the school subject “I and Society”, the Ministry of Education of 
Georgia stated that this subject would provide civic education for the III-IV grade 
pupils. Dissemination of the information about this subject caused the diversity of 
assessments regarding its benefits for the target audience.  
The 17th of May demonstration in 2013 was evaluated as the restriction of 
freedom of expression by the demonstration led by orthodox priests (Civil Georgia, 
2013). The right of the freedom of expression represents the basic right of human 
and as the priests were named as the organizers of demonstration which turned out 
to be the source of the restriction of the freedom of expression of another group, the 
GOC was evaluated as being anti-Western institution, and against the European 
values. Therefore, the study of the GOC discourse, also the prevailing discourse 
among the GOC members, about these issues and, in general, about the EU is the 
key to understand which stance is taken by them. It is also possible that the GOC 
and some of its members perceive some aspects of the European values as 
unacceptable for them but this does not necessarily make the GOC as anti-EU 
institution. 
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In order to figure out the attitude and discourse of the GOC towards the 
above-mentioned issues and also to the EU, the statements of the Patriarch of all 
Georgia Ilia II, the decisions of the Holy Synod and other respective members of 
the GOC, for example, the person who takes high position in the department of 
education within the GOC, will be applied. The discourses of the these persons 
labelled as articulation of pro-Russian attitude will also be discussed. 
In order to clarify who speaks for the GOC and whose statements can be 
identified as influential, in the following paragraphs the structure of the GOC will 
be briefly outlined. 
The Holy Synod of the GOC represents the highest branch of church 
authority, but in between of Holy Synod meetings the Patriarch of Georgia, Ilia II 
is the supreme authority and governor of the GOC. In addition, the Patriarch is the 
chairman of the Holy Synod (Patriarchate of Georgia, 2016).  
The Holy Synod is represented by 47 members. Among its members, 26 are 
metropolitans, including the Patriarch who is also archbishop, 13 of them are 
bishops and the rest 8 are archbishop. The members of Holy Synod are the head of 
eparchies in Georgia and abroad. There are 40 eparchies in Georgia and 7 in the 
following geographical areas:    
 Eparchy of Western Europe; 
 Eparchy of Great Britain and Ireland; 
 Eparchy of Belgium and Netherlands; 
 Eparchy of Germany and Austria; 
 Eparchy of North America; 
 Eparchy of South America; 
 Eparchy of Australia; (Patriarchate of Georgia, 2016) 
Decision-making in the Holy Synod is based on the majority voting, but if the 
voting results are equal, then the decision is made according to the Patriarch’s 
opinion and the resolution of the Holy Synod is obligatory for the all members of 
the GOC (Patriarchate of Georgia, 2016). 
27 
 
There are three levels of degrees among churchmen, the lowest one is deacon, 
the middle one - priest and the highest is high priest. These degrees are divided into 
different sub-degrees, depends on the type of ‘white and black clergy’. For example, 
the middle degree consists of three different sub-degrees in white clergy: the priest, 
the archpriest and protopresbyter. The last degree is the highest in the white clergy. 
As for the highest degree in the ‘black clergy’, it is metropolitan (Megrelishvili, 
2003, as reffered at Orthodoxy.ge).  
Considering the persons who can speak for the GOC, the first one is the 
Patriarch of Georgia, then other members of the Holy Synod, followed by the 
priests, mostly protopresbyter and archpriests. The heads of the eparchy, bishop, 
archbishop or metropolitan with the high probability have the influence over the 
churchmen serving within their eparchies. Protopresbyters are the heads of 
cathedral churches and the archpriests are the heads of the temples. Within the 
‘black clergy’, after the first three highest degrees mentioned above, the degree of 
archimandrite is represented who supervises the heads of the monasteries. 
To return to the methodology, discursive psychology is interested in the 
production of meanings, in particular, how they are produced within discourses, 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 119) and as this thesis tries to study the prevailing 
discourse among the GOC members towards the EU, the research focus will be on 
the GOC members discursive construction of the EU based on the interview 
method. 
Generally, interviews can be structured, semi-structured and unstructured. 
Structured interviews are mainly used during quantitative research while in case of 
the qualitative study, semi-structured or unstructured interviews are exercised 
(Edwards & Holland, 2013, pp. 2-3). The semi-structured interviews have the 
following central characteristics: 
 Interactive dialogue; 
 topic-centered method, meaning that the interviewee has issues which 
should be covered during the interactive dialogue; 
 “Meanings and understandings are created in an interaction, which is 
effectively a co-production, involving the construction or 
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reconstruction of knowledge.” (Mason, 2002, p. 62, as cited in 
Edwards & Holland, 2013, p.3) 
Within the discursive psychology unstructured or semi-structured interviews 
for studying the language are applied.  It is noted that mostly it is enough to use a 
selection of few empirical data, for instance, less than 10 interviews. This happens 
because the main center of the study is language use, and based on few people, it is 
possible to identify, form and maintain the particular discursive elements. 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 120-121) 
The following study desires to conduct interviews with about 10 members of 
the GOC. It is preferable to include as many hierarchical levels as possible and to 
manage meetings with the GOC members from deacon to metropolitan. Though, it 
should be acknowledged that from the sensitivity of the topic of the interviews, 
potential respondents might refuse to participate. 
The questionnaire for the respondents will cover the following issues: law 
about the elimination of all forms of discrimination, the subject “I and society”, the 
case of 17th of May demonstration and issues related to the freedom of expression, 
the attitude of the GOC towards the EU and issues the respondents may identify as 
unacceptable for them and for the GOC.  
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The Influence of the GOC over the Politics in Georgia 
In the following chapter, examples of the GOC influence, not only over the 
majority of Georgian society (voters) but also over the politicians, will be 
illustrated.  
In order to depict the picture of the church acceptance and popularity, the 
results of different surveys will be applied. In particular, the opinion polls 
conducted by the International Republican Institute and National Democratic 
Institute. Before illustrating the results of the opinion polls, it should be noted that 
approximately 84% of Georgians are Christian Orthodox (National Statistic office 
of Georgia, 2014).   
According to the opinion poll results about the level of trust in different 
institutions in Georgia, the GOC is ranked at the first place with 91% (Baltic 
Surveys/The Gallup, 2015). In addition, the GOC is an institution in Georgia, which 
is capable to mobilize the most people compared to the other political groups or 
institutions in Georgia (Chitanava, 2015, p. 52). Furthermore, the outcome of the 
public opinion poll published by the National Democratic Institute clarifies that 
approximately 35% of voters make their election decisions based on the viewpoints 
of the priest and parish (Tabula, 2016).  
The most vivid example of the priests’ influence are the pre-parliamentary 
election developments. Despite the fact that the Holy Synod made decision obliging 
the churchmen to take a neutral stance, part of the churchmen did not agree with 
and disobeyed the adopted resolution. They publicly shared their political sympathy 
for the Georgian Dream coalition and attended the demonstration organized by the 
main opposing political actor. In addition to their personal support, they also called 
the voters not to vote for the then ruling party - United National Movement. As the 
Holy Synod called for the neutral position, the churchmen supporting the main 
opposition party claimed that if it became necessary, they would even abandon their 
positions, being the churchmen, and undress the cassocks. As the opinion of 
churchmen and, in general, of the GOC was considerable, in order to increase the 
acceptance and popularity among the voters, the leader of the coalition Georgian 
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Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili was demonstrating the allegiance with the GOC. Thus, 
the engagement of Orthodox priests in pre-elections campaign and their support to 
the Georgian dream had its influence over the voters and contributed in the success 
of the coalition in the 2012 parliamentary elections. (Chitanava, 2015, p. 49) 
In general, since the Orthodox church is considered as the influential 
institution in Georgia, politicians and, mostly, political elite try to create the image 
of themselves as being closely associated with the GOC and avoid its criticism 
(Tsuladze, et al., 2016, pp. 151-152). 
 It should be noted that not only Georgian politicians, but also the 
representatives of the EU take into consideration that role of the GOC in the societal 
life is significant in Georgia, and during their visit in the country, they also meet 
the Patriarch Ilia II. Specifically, the clear demonstrations of the above-mentioned 
statement are the visits, of the previous EU commissioner for Enlargement and 
European Neighborhood policy - Štefan Füle and his successor – Johannes Hahn, 
with the Patriarch Ilia II. (Tsuladze, et al., 2016, p. 152)   
 Apart from the above-mentioned examples, in the following paragraphs the 
influence of the GOC over Georgian politicians will be illustrated. In particular, 
their statements regarding to the draft of the anti-discrimination law, the draft of the 
subject “I and Society”, the code of the local self-government and the initiation 
related to the empowering of the Patriarch Ilia II with the right of granting the right 
to pardon the prisoners.  
 In 2013, the draft of the new self-government code was presented to the 
Parliament of Georgia. According to the Patriarch, acceptance of this draft law 
would cause collapse within Georgia. In order to avoid the destruction in the 
country, Ilia II asked the Parliament for further discussion of the draft law for 
improving its quality (Dgebuadze, 2013). 
With regard to the Patriarchs position, the then deputy chairperson of the 
Parliament – Manaka Kobakhidze stated the following: “I would be interested to go 
deeper and figure out what kind of threats the GOC sees in the draft code,” she 
continues that  “the government listens to the Patriarch and the position of the GOC 
is always important” (Interpressnews, 2013).   Besides the comment of the deputy 
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chairperson of the Parliament, Eka Beselia, the chairperson of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Protection of Human Rights and Civil Integration, stated that the 
evaluation and “the position of his holiness is important”. Finally, because of the 
Patriarch’s criticism, the hearings of the then draft in the parliament were suspended 
and the appropriate body of the government was obliged to make necessary 
amendments (Chitanava, 2015, p. 49; Vacharadze, 2015).  
In case of the draft of the school subject “I and Society”, the Holy Synod 
presented their evaluation and emphasized that there were problematic issues which 
deserved to be reviewed. Specifically, the Holy Synod claimed that the topics 
included in the subject, such as, political theories, gender identity and etc. would 
have been confusing for the teachers and also for the pupils (Patriarchate of 
Georgia, 2015). 
The Minister of Education of that time, Tamar Sanikidze said that “the 
Ministry cooperates with the GOC and proceeds the final consultations with the 
GOC in order to create standard of the subject.” (Avaliani, 2016) 
Generally, in cooperation with the GOC, the draft standard of the subject 
was amended. In particular, based on the recommendations of the GOC, the term 
“I and Family” was changed to “My family” in order to avoid distancing child from 
family. (Netgazeti.ge, 2015)   
The next topic in which the influence of the GOC can be identified is the 
discussions about granting the right of the amnesty to the Patriarch. In December 
2015, the Prime Minister at that time – Irakli Gharibashvili and Ilia II attended the 
play at the theatre performed by women prisoners. After the play, Ilia II said that it 
would be better if he had the right of amnesty. Later, the GOC announced that the 
Patriarch’s position was based on the solidarity and support for women prisoners 
and not the demand to discuss this issue on legislative level (Tabula, 2015). 
Despite the statement of the GOC, the above-mentioned issue caused 
various opinions. Some of the NGO’s criticized such initiation (Civil Georgia, 
2015). But in the ruling party, it was evaluated in appositive way. For instance, 
Kakhi Kakhishvili, the Minister of Corrections, argued the following: “I think that 
the Patriarch should have such right, I do not know any other person wiser than 
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him. That is why I think that he should definitely have the right to grant clemency. 
In order to do that, constitutional amendment is necessary” (Civil Georgia, 2015). 
The administration of the Prime Minister announced the official statement and 
according to it “the Prime Minister thinks that the engagement of the Patriarch in 
granting clemency to convicts would have the positive role and calls the President 
and Parliament to start discussion on that matter.” In addition, it is written in the 
announcement that “the Catholicos Patriarch of all Georgia, his Holiness and 
Beatitude Ilia II is the spiritual leader and his advice is significant and valuable for 
everyone” (Civil Georgia, 2015). 
 Regarding to this initiation, Eka Beselia stated “I would have been very 
happy if we had accepted such political decision. Granting this special right to the 
Patriarch, who has the highest level of trust in the society, would have been very 
good and useful decision. If there is political consent, I am sure that there will be 
many supporters for granting this right to the Patriarch at the legislative level. I 
support and welcome this initiation” (Ambebi.ge, 2015). 
 The last issue which will be discussed in this chapter is about the discussion 
over the adoption of the law about elimination of all forms of discrimination. The 
Patriarch evaluated the above-mentioned law as the basis for legalizing the illegality 
(Civil Georgia, 2014).   
The most concerns were about the terms of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender 
identity’. As the non-traditional sexual relations are perceived as the deadly sin 
within orthodox believers, the then existing draft-law on the elimination of all forms 
of anti-discrimination was recognized as propaganda of this sin and its legalization. 
The Patriarch asked the parliament to delay the adoption of this draft-law and to 
provide the wider discussion about it within the Georgian society. (Interpressnews, 
2014) 
Before the adoption of the anti-discrimination bill, Eka Beselia had meeting 
and discussed the draft bill with the members of the GOC (News.ge, 2014). During 
the meeting, the draft bill was discussed article-by-article and after the meeting 
Beselia noted that the consensus with churchmen was partially reached and some 
amendments would be proceeded (Tsintsadze, 2014).  
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The deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Protection of 
Human Rights and Civil Integration Gedevan Popkhadze supported the draft law, 
but if the Holy Synod were against it, he was ready for not supporting the draft 
project initiated by the government of Georgia. Popkhadze argues:“Orthodox 
values are part of my identity and no matter how strong someone may demand from 
me ‘to be neutral from these values while making the decision,’ I cannot act in that 
way and I do not lie to anyone.” (Frontnews Georgia, 2014) 
Finally, despite the resistance from the GOC, the anti-discrimination bill 
was adopted by the parliament. The terms ‘sexual orientation and ‘gender identity’ 
were remained, but “the second paragraph of the article five makes clause that, none 
of the regulations of the bill can be defined in a way, which contradicts the 
constitutional agreement of the state and the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church “ (Transparency International - Georgia, 2014).   
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The Discourse Articulated by the Georgian Orthodox Church 
In the following chapter the discourse of the GOC is represented in two sub-
sections. The first identifies the GOC discourse towards the EU and the second one 
suggests the collection of examples of GOC statements which in academic papers 
and media sources are labelled as the pro-Russian sentiments.  
The Discourse of the GOC Towards the EU 
In this section, the attitude of the Patriarch Illia II and other high hierarchs of 
the GOC towards the issues related to the new self-government code, ‘I and 
Society’, 17th of May demonstration and anti-discrimination bill, will be elaborated.  
When the Georgian parliament was discussing the new code of self-
governance, the Patriarch of all Georgia Ilia II stated that: 
“Today our parliament and authority discuss the issue of self-governance. It 
is rather difficult subject and its implementation will cause the collapse of our 
country. We (meaning the GOC) will never tolerate to it and will take every possible 
measure to hinder its implementation. Georgia was and will be the united nation, 
united country. We have to remember that when the authority was powerful the 
country was powerful as well.” (Dgebuadze, 2013)  
He also added: “From our point of view all regions of Georgia should be 
directly connected to the central authorities. The government should be aware of 
the problems the regions face and there is no need for mediator. The government 
has to discuss and study what is necessary for each region of Georgia. Our 
authorities should try to eradicate the problem which exists in a region. Some people 
try to adopt this code as soon as possible. We (meaning the GOC) think that this 
code should be considered by the whole nation” (Kviris Palitra, 2013). 
 Later, the head of public relation department of the GOC, Deacon David 
Sharashenidze expressed the opinion of the GOC about the self-governance code, 
including the reasons why the draft law on self-governance was unacceptable for 
the GOC. According to him: 
“The GOC is not against strengthening of self-governing bodies and 
presented draft law deserves appreciations for the countries which have less 
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problems with restoration of territorial integrity. In our case, many aspects should 
be taken into consideration. Creation of regional self-governance based on the 
current draft law will provide the development of disintegrational processes” 
(Lomidze, 2013).  
It should be noted that many civil society institutions supported the 
government to accept the draft-bill rejected by the GOC (Civil Georgia, 2013).  
Later, it was said that the then prime minister of Georgia, Irakli 
Gharibashvili rejected the draft-law and demanded to remove the articles related to 
the creation of new regional autonomies in Georgia, in addition, the possibility of 
creation of new municipalities in Georgia based on the ethnical element was 
negatively evaluated by the Prime Minister Gharibashvili (Lomidze, 2013).  
The new code of self-governance was adopted in February 2014 
(Transparency International - Georgia, 2014), without any more discussions and 
debates among the Georgian society, the Georgian government and the GOC.  
The other issue which generated the debate, within civil society institutions, 
Georgian society and the GOC, was the draft-law about the elimination of all forms 
of discrimination. Generally, acceptance of this bill was the responsibility of 
Georgian government on its way to European integration, in particular, for fulfilling 
the aspects written in the roadmap of visa liberalization for Georgia (Transparency 
International - Georgia, 2014).  
 The Patriarch Ilia II emphasized that violence and discrimination is 
unacceptable for the GOC.  In addition, he stated that according to the existing laws 
the rights of the citizens of Georgia were equally protected and introduction of the 
concepts of “gender identity” and “sexual orientation” would cause confusion in 
Georgian society. As the non-traditional sexual relations are perceived as the deadly 
sin within orthodox believers, the then existing draft-law on the elimination of all 
forms of anti-discrimination was recognized as propaganda of this sin and its 
legalization. The Patriarch asked the parliament to detain the adoption of this draft-
law and to provide the wide discussion about it within the Georgian society. 
(Interpressnews, 2014) 
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  Despite the resistance of the GOC, the Georgian parliament adopted the 
law on elimination of all forms of discrimination, without removing the notions – 
‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity.’ Although, the adopted code included the 
protection of social moral as one of the legitimated goal of the law. It happened 
because of the activity of the GOC. Moreover, it was shared as the political 
compromise from government’s side. (Kunchulia, 2014) 
On the same day, when the law was adopted, the GOC made the following 
statement: 
“We are not able to agree or disagree on the current version of the law, 
because we did not have possibility to analyze it. And making hasty evaluations 
from different priests on this serious matter would not be right” (Accept, 2014).  
Later, the head of the GOC expressed his opinion about the adoption of anti-
discrimination bill: 
“I would like to talk about the adoption of anti-discrimination law... there 
are subjects which should not be allowed. How is that feasible to legalize the 
illegality? Legalization of illegality is a big sin and I said exactly about this, it would 
have been surprising and wondering if I have not said what I said. This law will not 
be accepted by any orthodox believer and I would like to emphasize that time will 
pass by and it will be surprising for us, how this bill was adopted. And I ask to the 
god to forgive our sins, whether intentional or unintentional.” (Civil Georgia, 2014) 
The next topic which deserved extensive attention not only from the GOC 
but also from the Orthodox believers was the celebration of international day 
against homophobia, transphobia and biphobia from minority group in Tbilisi in 
2013. This group was planning to organize a demonstration with the aim of 
attracting public attention about the existing evidences of homophobic attitude and 
discrimination of LGBT people (Interpressnews, 2013). The planned demonstration 
was widely accepted among believers as an insult for Georgian traditions and 
orthodox values. 
The day before the demonstration, the head of the GOC addressed to the 
Tbilisi City Hall and governmental authorities to abolish the permission of the 
demonstration. He stated the following: 
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“On 17th of May the demonstration is planned by sexual minority and their 
supporters, which aims not the solving of such people’s problems, but speculation 
by this issue. It is fact that in our country, despite the widespread traditional 
thinking, people representing the sexual minority can choose and realize their 
private life. It is also fact that the common rules for all mankind exist, including the 
moral rules. All religions discuss homosexuality as disease and anomaly... 
Homosexuals are viewed as heavy sinners from the GOC, the people, who need 
support to find the right way and not encouragement, moreover, spreading the ideas 
of homosexuality within the society... Our citizens see this demonstration as the 
violation of the rights of the majority, abusive for their traditions, beliefs and in 
general, for moral code. I think that Tbilisi City Hall and the government should 
consider these circumstances and abolish the permission on the planned 
demonstration. I want to note that the international conventions explicitly allow... 
to restrict the right of freedom of expression in order to protect the right and dignity 
of others and to avoid crime and destabilization” (Ambebi.ge, 2013). 
Some accidents and violence took place on 17th of May between opposing 
parties. It should be noted that many priests participated in the demonstration and 
this fact was evaluated as orthodox clergy-led manifestation. Furthermore, some of 
them took part in violent actions which made the major part of the Georgian society 
annoyed and the image of the GOC was disparaged. 
Regarding the consequences of 17th of May, Ilia II said: 
“What happened on May 17 is very regrettable... ideas which [gay right 
activists] wanted to install there, are completely unacceptable in Georgia”. He also 
added:“ it is also very regrettable that the Georgian clergy was acting impolitely 
and I want to call on everyone for calm” (Civil Georgia, 2013). 
In addition to the Patriarch’s position, the Georgian Patriarchate published 
the statement related to the 17th of May demonstration. This statement also showed 
the regrets of the GOC for what happened on that day and clarified that the GOC 
should take the necessary procedures against the priests engaged in violent actions. 
As for the anti-gay manifestation, the report included components of describing the 
rally as having provocative nature. The first reason was widespread orthodox values 
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among the Georgian society, and this rally was identified as propaganda of 
homosexuality by them. The venue, was viewed as the second component 
increasing the provocative nature of the manifestation, as having “strong emotional 
ties” to Georgia’s “historical memory and traditions.” (Civil Georgia, 2013) 
The other issue, deserving the negative evaluation from the GOC is the plan 
of the Minister of Education to introduce the new subject “I and society” at schools. 
The basic aim of this subject is facilitation of civic education among pupils.  
The Holy Synod released a statement that draft of this subject involves 
‘serious gaps’ and it is necessary to discuss the existing draft with the society, in 
order to take into consideration the opinion not only of the society, also the point of 
view of other traditional religious groups. (Tabula, 2015) 
The following aspects, in the standard of this subject related to the political 
theories, such as liberalism and democratic values, the notion of gender identity, 
some method of psychotherapy, for instance:  brainstorming and hot-seat technique, 
were recognized from the GOC as confusing not just for the pupils but also for the 
teachers. (Patriarchate of Georgia, 2015)  
During the communication process between the representatives of the 
Ministry of Education of Georgia and the department of education of the GOC some 
terms were changed. For example, based on the recommendations of the GOC, the 
term “I and Family” was changed to “My family” in order to avoid distancing child 
from family. (Netgazeti.ge, 2015)   
In should be noted that the GOC itself was not against teaching the subject 
at schools. According to deputy chairman of the educational department of the 
GOC, Bidzina Gunia, the problem was about the standard, on which later the subject 
should be built. The aim of discussions was to improve the quality of standard, 
creating the correspondence of the subject with the social need and etc.; that is why 
engagement of psychologists, teachers, parents, religious groups and scientists in 
discussions should have critical importance. (Bejitashvili, 2015) 
To move from the policy-oriented controversies to the representation of the 
European Union, the following paragraphs will describe the attitude of the Patriarch 
Ilia II towards the EU.  
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During the meeting with the then commissioner for Enlargement and 
European Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle, Ilia II said: “We are very satisfied that 
today Georgia, after passing the difficult period of communist regime, takes steps 
towards the integration in the European structures. The European Union is a well-
known organization for Georgians and we are doing everything for becoming a full 
member of this great organization.” [...]in addition, the Patriarch added [...] “in 
some countries misleading information is spread, as if the GOC hinders the process 
of the European integration of Georgia. I would like to assure you that the GOC 
will take every possible mean for fulfilling this idea.” (Civil Georgia, 2014) 
Besides, he added that “there are non-governmental organizations, 
spreading the false information about the GOC’s attitude related to the Georgia’s 
Europeanization.” (Civil Georgia, 2014) Basically, these organizations emphasize 
that in case of values and culture, the GOC sees the threat in European integration. 
But, Ilia II mentioned that he “is absolutely sure that membership of the EU is quite 
possible based on the traditions and values of Georgians.” (Civil Georgia, 2014) 
On June 27, 2014, when the Association Agreement between the EU and 
Georgia was signed, the head of the GOC said that “now, as never before, we are 
approaching the European culture, but we should remember that it is not only a 
great honor for Georgia, but responsibility. God bless all the people who dedicated 
themselves for this happy day.” (Ambioni.ge, 2014)    
There is the commercial on the official TV channel of the GOC where the 
Patriarch Illia II expresses support of the GOC on the way of Georgia’s European 
integration with the following statement: “The European Union is a well-known 
organization for Georgian people and we are doing everything to become a full 
member of this big organization, I would like to assure you that Georgian Orthodox 
Church will do everything for realizing this idea” (TV channel of the GOC - 
Unanimity, 2016). 
In December 2015, the head of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker said that the visa free travel should be offered to Georgia (Jozwiak, 2015). 
On the next day, Ilia II met ambassador Janos Herman, Head of the European Union 
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Delegation to Georgia, and the then prime minister of Georgia, Irakli Gharibashvili. 
During the meeting the Patriarch said: 
” We are here to celebrate what happened yesterday. The European Union 
adopted the resolution that Georgia took a big step towards the EU. I would like to 
state that this is the great achievement, the great triumph of the whole Georgian 
people and the Orthodox church of Georgia.” (Chaduneli, 2015) 
At the same meeting, Ilia II mentioned that: “the full membership of the EU 
and strong connection impose the responsibility to us. We hope that the EU not only 
bring us lots of benefits, but also preserve our culture.” (Rustavi 2, 2015) 
At the meeting with Ilia II in December 2015, the president of Austria asked 
him about his personal opinions regarding the European choice of Georgia and 
Russo-Georgian relations at both governmental and religious levels. The head of 
the GOC answered that: “Georgia has chosen the European way. Willing to become 
the part of the European democratic structures. This choice is firm and we will 
definitely reach our aim. As for the relations among churches, it is tough.” 
(Interpressnews, 2015) 
The Examples of the GOC Discourse Labelled as Pro-Russian 
In media sources and academic papers, some statements of the GOC 
members, including the Patriarch, are evaluated as pro-Russian rhetoric. These 
discourses are generalized at the whole GOC level, thus, according to such sources 
the most trusted institution in Georgia is viewed as anti-EU and the one ‘playing 
Russian game’. 
For instance, in one of the publications, the author argues, that even after 
the war 2008 between Georgia and Russia, the GOC has not stopped its ‘pro-
Russian game’.  Moreover, the same author argues that “the Church took on anti-
Western views prevalent in Putin’s Russia, took it up to the level of doctrine and 
has since been teaching it everywhere, in every sermon and has never missed an 
occasion to weave it into their public speeches. This is done at the local level, at 
every church, by every bishop and by every church hierarch.” (Vacharadze, 2015, 
p. 55) 
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According to Chitanava (2015), “pro-Russian sentiments are heavily 
emanating from the GOC” and the ‘same-faith’ discourse is actively promoted by 
the Orthodox churchmen. As an example, the author brings the words of the 
Patriarch – “Putin is a wise man” and "the love between Georgia and Russia will be 
eternal" (Chitanava, 2015, pp. 45,55.). 
In the media sources, Gegelia (2013) notes that the GOC has the shameful 
rhetoric while emphasizing the friendship of two nations, Georgia and Russia 
(Gegelia, 2013). Muchaidze (2014), claims that the identification of Russia, as the 
defender of the genuine values of Christianity, and the fighter against ‘Gayropa’, 
have influence over the majority of Georgian population and this influence is 
strengthened by the statements of the high hierarchs of the GOC (Muchaidze, 
2014).   
Regarding the clashes taken place on 17th of May, in one of the media 
sources, the journalist states that “the actions of the Church and its parish on 17th of 
May have proved that the majority of Georgian population do not share Western 
values and thus the state is not ready to be integrated in the Western world. The 
threat of theocracy in Georgia has become vivid. There are parallels with Iran, the 
governing principles of Bolsheviks’, medieval centuries, which of course is in 
contradiction with the liberal and democratic values. What more can be meant by 
returning to the Russian orbit?!” (Matiashvili, 2013). From this logic, it can be 
argued that the role of the church regarding the 17th may demonstrations is 
evaluated in a way, that the GOC is against accepting of Western values in Georgia.  
The discourse of the GOC related to Russia, the 17th of May demonstration, 
the draft of the anti-discrimination bill and LGBT rights were noted by Kakabadze 
(2014) and the author argues that there is the pro-Russian discourse in the GOC.  
The following paragraphs discuss the statements of the Ilia II, based on 
which the above-mentioned author argues that the GOC shares the Russian 
discourse. His judgement is made about the consideration by the Patriarch Ilia II of 
homosexuality as “anomaly and disease,” and the 17th of May demonstration - as 
the “insult to Georgian traditions” (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 2013). In 
addition, Kakabadze brings another example - the Patriarch Ilia II announced 17th 
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of as family day, its strength and purity. The day before the 17th May demonstration 
in 2014, the GOC publicized the statement and in this statement, it is said that “The 
purity of the family and its solidity is the foundation of the state power. The 
encroachment of the purity of family, recognition of the perverted and unnatural 
relations as natural is not acceptable neither for the majority of Georgian population 
regardless their religious beliefs nor for the Orthodox Church. But, this does not 
mean that the church fights against the sinner. On the contrary the church takes care 
of such person and strives for their betterment. I order to avoid god’s anger; the 
church unfolds and fights against the sin and its public propaganda. That is why the 
church tries to protect the nation from legalizing the immorality and spiritual 
violence.” [...] in addition, by this statement the GOC says that [...] “As we are 
informed, part of the Orthodox believers is planning to organize demonstration. The 
church was and is against any kind of violence and we would like to call them for 
holding the demonstration peacefully.” (Civil Georgia, 2014) 
According to Kakabadze (2014) the examples illustrated above “shows how 
discourse articulated by the Kremlin is shared by the Georgian Orthodox Church 
and projected onto the society. Gay propaganda, pedophilia, the West being pervert, 
is present in the discourse articulated by the hierarchs of the Georgian Orthodox 
Church, in the same way, the Russian political elite does.” (Kakabadze, 2015, p. 
46) 
Summary of the GOC Discourse 
According to the presented evidences it can be argued that the most concern 
of the GOC regarding the EU is related to some cultural aspects accepted in the 
most EU member states. In this regard, the Patriarch Ilia II declared in his Christmas 
epistle that Georgia is the part of “Christian Europe”, though the European Union 
should consider the “traditions and mindset” of the country (Civil Georgia, 2014).  
The analysis of the discourses also showed that the recognition of sexual relations 
between same sex people, not as deviation, but, as normal and natural represents 
the controversial issue for the GOC and the Georgian society.  
The articulated discourse of the GOC in regard of the anti-discrimination 
bill and the draft of the school subject “I and Society”, reveals that the GOC has 
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negative attitude towards the issues of ‘gender identity’ and ‘sexual orientation.’ 
Although, in all of these cases, the GOC does not represent strictly opposing actor, 
more specifically, as it is clarified in the statement of the GOC, “I and Society” is 
not unacceptable for them, but the topics included in the draft are the matter of 
discussion and amendments are necessary.  
The draft of the anti-discrimination bill is perceived as the threat of 
legalizing the non-traditional sexual relations in Georgia and such relations are 
recognized as depravity and immorality. The same applies to the 17th of May 
minority demonstration. 
As for the draft of the self-government law, the statements uncover that the 
Orthodox Church is not against the adoption of the draft per se, but encourages the 
government to conduct discussions with interest groups in order to work out the 
more consensual draft. 
In all three cases, main concern for the GOC was that adoption of these 
drafts and the book, and also propagation of gay rights would damage the widely-
accepted traditional family values. 
It is important to mention that traditional families are strongly valued within 
the European Union as well and the propaganda of LGBT rights is negatively 
perceived. For example, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania are recognized as the 
countries not very welcoming to the LGBT minority rights (Sheftalovich, 2016).  
In Poland, the ruling party - Roman Catholic Law and Justice is recognized as anti-
gay, its Chairman Jarolaw Kaczynski states that "affirmation of homosexuality will 
lead to the downfall of civilization" (Smith, 2016). In addition, Poland, together 
with Hunagry postponed “an EU ministerial agreement that would have forced all 
EU countries to honor same-sex “marriages” wherever they were contracted in the 
European Union [...] they argued that [...] “this would violate their sovereign 
prerogative to legislate on marriage and family matters” (Gennarini, 2015).  
The anti-LGBT statements are not unfamiliar for the Lithuanian society 
either. While working over the partnership bill, the authorities of Lithuania were 
discussing it with Catholic Church. It should be noted that same-sex marriage is not 
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included in the bill and, generally, in Lithuania, the catholic church has significantly 
conservative attitudes towards family issues (Kropaite, 2015).   
Moreover, in the seven member states of the European Union same-sex 
marriage is constitutionally prohibited. For example, the constitution of Hungary 
stipulates the following: “Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman established by voluntary decision, and the family as 
the basis of the nation’s survival” (Hungary's Constitution of 2011). In addition to 
Hungary, constitutions of Slovakia, Latvia, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland and Bulgaria 
also define marriage as the union of one man and one woman (Constitution of the 
Replic of Bulgaria, 1991) (Constitution of The Republic of Poland, 1997) (The 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 1992) (Mass Resistance, 2013) (Sheeter, 
2005) (Tomek, 2014). Even though these countries do not accept gay marriages, 
this does not mean that they are anti-EU. They are the members of the European 
Union and but maintain their traditional stance with regard to LGBT rights. Based 
on this logic, neither the GOC can be assumed as anti-EU or pro-Russian institution 
because of its support to defend traditional family values.  
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The Discourse Articulated by the Representatives of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church 
Description of the Respondents 
In order to figure out the patterns of the discourse articulated within the 
GOC, qualitative research tool, in particular semi-structured interview method was 
applied. In the beginning, the potential respondents were selected based on the 
personal contact and later by using snowball method.  
The initial idea was to conduct the interviews with the members expressing 
pro-European, pro-Russian or neutral stance regarding the foreign policy direction 
of Georgia. In addition, the author of this dissertation aimed to record as many 
interviews as possible. Only 11 persons agreed to participate in interviews out of 
30. As for their age, it varies from 22 to 70. It should be noted that reaching the 
members of the GOC who take radical or anti-European positions was almost 
impossible. In addition, an interview with one of the respondents was conducted by 
cell phone.  
The original aim was to include all the hierarchical levels and this goal was 
reached. Although, the representativeness of the GOC members based on the 
hierarchies is not equal.  Eight persons out of 11 were archpriests and the rest three 
were metropolitan, deacon and archimandrite.  Among those, who denied or did not 
take part in the interviews because of different reasons, 12 members were 
archpriests, four metropolitans, one protopresbyter and two deacons. Besides the 
deacon, all other members can be identified as influential. 
Generally educational background of the respondents was the following: 
economic, journalistic, history, cinematography, psychology, theology, engineering 
and economics. The only one respondent have Bachelor, Master and Doctor’s 
degree. All of them have degree in theology, in addition, some of them have 
educational background from other fields.   
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Brief Outline of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was created based on the issues on which the GOC was 
evaluated as having anti-European stance according to mass media and/or non-
governmental organizations.  
The respondents were asked the question about the anti-discrimination law, 
code of self-governance, the subject – ‘I and Society,’ 17th of May demonstration 
and freedom of expression, the Georgian Orthodox Church’s attitudes towards the 
European integration of Georgia and etc. It should be noted that answers on the 
questions make it possible to figure out whether the respondents have an 
understanding of the EU-Georgia relations or it is completely unknown for them. 
In addition, answers of the respondents reveal the thoughts of the GOC members 
regarding the sensitive issues, such as the possibility for minority groups to freely 
express their thoughts and opinions. As a result, the elements of the discursive 
patterns within the GOC towards the EU can be identified. 
                  Analysis of the Interviews 
On the question about the GOC’s attitude to support the European 
Integration of Georgia, nine respondents said that the church has quite positive 
stance about this issue. In addition, all of them agree on the current policy approach 
and they themselves support Georgia’s Europeanization. One interviewee, the 
archpriest, described the internal situation as heterogeneous: “On the one hand, 
there is group which takes pro-EU stance, while on the other hand, there is a group 
of people, the radical one, which does not support the policy of the Georgian 
government to become the full member of the EU. Generally, I would say that more 
people do not express the pro-EU approach. Although, it should be mentioned that 
their influence within the GOC is not tangible. In addition, mostly people who have 
pro-European approach have bigger influence compared to the above-mentioned 
group. In regard to the common attitude in the GOC, I think it is neutral.” In 
addition, he emphasized that he himself supports the full membership of Georgia in 
the EU. One respondent noted that some priests in their preaches positively talk 
about the European future of our country, while others mention cultural aspects 
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from the EU values, which are unacceptable for Georgians, therefore the latter 
distance themselves from the EU and do not support the idea of being a full member 
of the European family. But, he himself states that the church is not able and should 
not take pro-EU, neutral or pro-Russian position, because these issues are not 
matters of the GOC: “The only thing I can say is that, we (state) should not take one 
approach radically, I think that we have to live for today and then we can see what 
we can do in the future, but again radical choice does not seem to be beneficial.” 
One of the respondents argued that the choice of the GOC and its position is based 
on the will of society, their attitude towards the country’s Europeanization and the 
current situation within the country.  Additionally, the interviewees were asked to 
roughly estimate how the supporters of the pro-EU or pro-Russian choices are 
distributed within the GOC. Four respondents noted that judging from their 
personal contacts, the distribution can be evaluated as 50%-50%.  In case of one 
interviewee, as mentioned above, he thinks that more than 50% supports pro-
Russian attitude. Five participants said that they do not have enough information 
and it is difficult for them to evaluate the distribution. One respondent said that he 
has never thought about this matter and has no answer. 
In case of the question about the reforms implemented by the government 
since 2012, such as anti-discrimination bill and code of local self-government, all 
respondents think that these actions were taken in order to get closer to the EU. 
Although, two of them emphasized that the law on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination was adopted because of the pressure from the EU: “Our government 
does not have a choice, as we want to be members of the EU, they have to adopt 
the laws which are not recommended but super imposed by the EU institutions. If 
the government does not meet the strict demands of the EU, then the probability to 
become the EU member will become questionable.” One respondent said that he is 
not much aware of legislative issues and is not able to state why they were adopted. 
But, he stated the following: “I am not aware of the rules, codes and legislative 
issues, I think that the most important for our country is maintaining its connection 
to the EU and the US.  We have to get closer to the EU. These laws are good if they 
give us a chance to get closer to the EU, if not then adopting of these codes will not 
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be a positive step from my point of view. I would like Georgia to be the part of the 
European Union like Romania, Bulgaria and Greece.” According to an interviewee, 
“the adoption of these new laws is a good step from the parliament of Georgia. I 
think that these laws are excellent and the adoption of them clarifies that our country 
is on the way of progress and development.” 
The attitude of interviewees regarding to the adoption of the law on the 
elimination of all forms of discrimination can be evaluated as neutral. One 
respondent identified it as an absolutely positive step: “as the adoption of the law 
was part of the roadmap to get visa liberalization, Georgia successfully fulfill this 
responsibility and took the next step towards the EU.” Some respondents stressed 
that what is written in the bill is already rooted in Georgian culture and 
consciousness that is why they do not see the necessity for the adoption of the law. 
They also stated that putting on the paper what is already entrenched in our culture 
is not a problem.  Their attitude can be summarized with the following: “we are 
Christians and our religion teaches us love, not hatred, kindness, not violence and 
with this law, the government only formalized the morally existing rules.” One 
interviewee mentioned that if we look at this code as the possibility to get closer to 
the EU, its adoption is positive, but if we look at this code from the viewpoint of 
our Christian values, then it can be argued that the approval of this code is negative 
step from the government. One respondent argued that the draft of anti-
discrimination law should have been discussed thoroughly by the society, by the 
GOC, ethnical and religious minorities. From this perspective, he evaluates the 
adoption of this law as hasty. One interviewee claimed that there was no necessity 
to adopt this law, no social requirement for it.  
Responses regarding to the development of the May 17 were mostly 
homogeneous. Almost all respondents stated that it was the act of sin, which is 
condemned according to orthodox Christianity. 
In addition, before answering the questions about their attitude towards 
minority demonstration and the restriction of freedom of expression, almost all 
interviewees stated that generally the GOC members had no intention to hinder 
someone to express his or her opinion. Some of them mentioned that they were 
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participating in the demonstration and according to them, the consequences of 
clashes most likely would have been much more severe if priests had not taken part 
in manifestation and detained the aggressive mass of people, who wanted to hinder 
the demonstration organized by the minority group. Some respondents evaluated 
the development of the situation as the minority group’s well-organized 
provocation. According to one of them, “some organizations needed to show that 
they were working and protecting minority rights while there was no problem with 
minority groups, no violation of their rights. In addition, provokers had their 
material purposes, because after this demonstration they would have received grants 
from the other organizations.” Couple of respondent said that what happened at that 
day is a black spot and open wound for the GOC: “All thinking churchmen are 
worried for what happened independently from us (means churchmen) on 17th of 
May.  The fact that couple of priests made mistakes does not mean that it is the 
mistake of the GOC and it shares their attitude towards minority groups. Our (the 
GOC) approach towards such groups is not aggressive and we do not repulse them 
with stool. Our god is the god of love and it is impossible from the churchman who 
serves the god of love, oppose anyone in a physical manner. Our attitude towards 
sinners will never be hostile, but we will always be merciless to sin.” 
  Majority of respondents expressed their concerns regarding the way how 
17th of May demonstration was covered in mass media sources and evaluated by 
non-governmental organizations. In particular, they showed the image of the church 
as anti-European, source of hatred and oppressor. All respondents said that couple 
of priests participating in the demonstration violated not just civil code, but also, 
they did the act of sin. Then the actions of these priests were widely shared through 
the social network and media sources. Consequently, the priests and generally the 
GOC was depicted as oppressors and brutal. According to one of the interviewees, 
“when we (the members of the GOC) have meetings with foreigners, delegations 
from other countries, they have bias about us based on the information provided by 
mass media sources, non-governmental organizations and etc. But, after the 
meeting they are pleasantly surprised that we are not radicals can close-minded 
people.”   
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 As argued by another interviewee, people representing sexual minority did 
not choose the right path: “Discrimination of people regarding its sexual, political 
or racial identity is completely unacceptable for me. But, we should not support the 
spread of sins and as the 17th of May demonstration from minority group was the 
act to propaganda of their way of life, that is why priests protested this 
demonstration.” In addition, the interviewee argued that “there are gathering places 
in Tbilisi where LGBT persons meet each other. Everyone knows these places but 
no one opposes them to meet. But 17th of May demonstration was not usual 
gathering, it was the act of sin, promotion of sin and that is why I and other members 
of the GOC protested it.”  Another respondent argued: “what happened on 17th of 
May caused protest in me, there were acts of violence from some of priests and I 
definitely do not agree with such approach. But, it does not mean that I agree 
promotion of the lifestyle of LGBT people. They are sinners and we (the GOC) 
should definitely oppose the spread of sin, otherwise future generation of our 
country will be negatively influenced by such groups. Be an LGBT person but do 
not spread the viewpoint that the lifestyle you have is correct and there is nothing 
wrong with it!” 
Some priests argued that as the people representing sexual minority have 
never had any problem within the society and their rights were not violated, there 
was no need to organize such manifestation. When it comes to the issue on the 
restriction of freedom of expression, majority of the respondents emphasized that 
the Georgian government should have taken into consideration the fact that more 
than 80% of Georgian population is orthodox and such demonstration would cause 
anger within the society. Judging from the existing situation, these interviewees 
argued that this minority group should not have had the permission of the 
manifestation.  
Regarding the general opinion about the circumstances when the freedom 
of expression should be restricted, one respondent claimed the following: “When 
demonstration consists anti-state and ‘anti-church’ activities, it should be restricted, 
or even banned. Also, openly abusing the Patriarch of Georgia and offending the 
GOC should be restricted because such freedom of expression negatively affects on 
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the emotional feelings of believers, moreover, it impacts on their national and moral 
feelings and this is not good. Such demonstration will definitely cause resistance 
and tension within the society. The government should think about its population 
and the rule of law in the country, from this logic, the demonstrations which have 
the characteristics mentioned above should be restricted.” The other respondent said 
that “any kind of expression which serves the depravity of a human should be 
restricted. When the promotion of illness (being an LGBT person is an illness from 
his point of view) is planned on the state level, then the government should try to 
avoid such actions, as they represent the promotion of a particular sin. According 
to one of the churchmen, “the GOC cannot make compromise when the issue is 
about the sin. This is an abomination and we should avoid such manifestations in 
peaceful ways. If we do not contradict it, then it means that we agree. I, as a 
churchman, cannot agree on such manifestations. I think that the minority group 
should take into consideration the opinions of majority and the expression should 
never be propaganda of a particular lifestyle. On 17th of May, LGBT minority group 
had placard ‘be colored’ and I think that by this statement they encouraged people 
to become ‘colored’ and to accept their lifestyle as normal. This is exactly the 
propaganda which I will never accept as normal and always contradict in a peaceful 
manner.”  
One respondent stated that, “such minorities have the right to express their 
ideas and opinions freely but the venue should be chosen carefully. For example, 
the demonstration should not be held in the city center, closer to school and etc. 
Otherwise it will cause anger within the majority of the society and clashes will be 
highly probable.” One of the interviewees said: “I have enough power to endure the 
demonstration organized by LGBT groups like it was 17th of May. But, others think 
that as such parade is a threat, it should be hindered and avoided. I think that it is 
not necessary to create new hot topics which cause tensions. In addition, I think that 
it is not correct to organize a demonstration, which is unacceptable for the majority 
of Georgians, and try to test if the population of the country endure spread of 
unacceptable lifestyle in their country. This is the transforming of peaceful situation 
into tensions. Thus, I do not see any necessity of organizing such demonstrations.” 
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One of the archpriests stated that the organizers wanted the demonstration to be 
provocative. According to him “the GOC and the government suggested this group 
another venue for the rally, but they wanted it to be provocative and finally the 
clashes took place. Everyone should have the right to express their opinion but 
majority of the people in Georgia do not like the expression of the ideas, 
representing the propaganda of the sin, which is perceived as a threat among the 
majority of Georgian population. That is why people, including churchmen, 
protested this demonstration.” 
As for the common position within the GOC about the restriction of the 
above-mentioned demonstration, eight respondents said that generally the members 
of the GOC oppose such sort of expression, one archpriest said that he does not 
have enough information to evaluate the general position within the members. Two 
respondents stated that there are liberal minded members, who think that LGBT 
minority group should have the right to express their opinions freely, one of them 
does not agree such statement and radically oppose LGBT manifestation and the 
second one thinks that some conditions, clauses should be met, for example, the 
nature of demonstration, the place where it will take place, and then it they should 
have the possibility to express their views.  
 Regarding the draft of the school subject “I and Society”, two respondents 
opposed this innovation, one of them stated the following: “the draft of this subject 
is terrible, it is a well-wrapped trap. It seems as though the subject teaches pupils 
how to integrate within the society and acquire some skills but these are just façade. 
The real goal of this subject is to deprave pupils, for example by teaching that LGBT 
people and their lifestyle is ordinary phenomena and it is not a deviation. That is 
why I opposed the introduction of this subject.” Another archpriest claimed that the 
first draft of the standard needed to be revised and improved based on the evaluation 
of the GOC. At the same time, he thinks that there is no need of teaching this 
subject.  
Four interviewees said that they like the idea of the subject but based on the 
current draft they have remarks and it seems that for them the introduction of the 
subject at school in the form of the current version is unacceptable. One of them 
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stated that “introducing this subject at school is not just recommended, but imposed 
by the EU and the current draft of the standard represents a threat, because it will 
provide propaganda of depravity among pupils.” Although, he added that the idea 
of the subject to enhance civic consciousness, is acceptable for him, but only after 
satisfying one condition – planning and implementing this project in coordination 
with the GOC.  
One respondent mentioned that he does not agree with the idea that this 
subject will provide the deprivation of pupils. In addition, according to him idea of 
the subject cannot be a threat but the most important factor for him is adaptation of 
the topics and the whole subject to the target audience. From this logic, he shares 
the remarks of the GOC education center.  
Four respondents mentioned that they are not much aware of this subject 
and their knowledge about this matter is based on the evaluation of center of 
education of the GOC: “I do not know this subject in deep details, but I know that 
the ministry of education and the appropriate department of the GOC worked 
together in order to establish the standard, on which the subject will be created. As 
far as I know some remarks of the GOC were taken into consideration but there still 
are aspects which are unacceptable for the GOC and I think that it would be better 
if the ministry of education takes into account the position and remarks of the 
GOC.” 
On the question, whether the GOC supports strong economic ties with the 
EU, while some of the aspects of cultural proximity are perceived as threat, absolute 
majority of the respondents (9) answers that this is not reality. One of the archpriest 
mentioned the following: “there are priests who think that some cultural aspects 
widespread in the EU are threat for Georgian culture. But, I cannot agree with them, 
I doubt that their fears are based on the lack of knowledge, they do not know the 
EU and its cultural elements good enough, consequently such situation causes 
confusion and concerns. I think that we need more communication with the EU, as 
a result the unreasonable fears will disappear.  As for the general attitude, the GOC 
does support the pro-EU path of the country and does not perceive the necessity of 
stronger economic ties while distancing itself from cultural aspects.” Another 
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archpriest mentioned that “some cultural aspects can be identified as threats but this 
fact does not necessarily mean that, generally, cultural proximity is a threat.” In 
addition, he emphasized that “Georgia needs not just cultural, but also proximity in 
other fields as our country strives to become a full member of the EU.” One 
respondent argued that the GOC might be against some cultural elements 
widespread some members of the EU. For example, “same sex-marriage is possible 
in some countries of the EU, this aspect can be counted as not acceptable for the 
GOC. But, this is not the widely-shared component throughout the whole union. I 
think that the GOC does not support strong economic relations and tries to avoid 
the cultural proximity, on the contrary, on our way of cooperation, we need cultural 
exchanges, experience and knowledge sharing.” One of the respondents claims that 
the GOC supports the economic aspects of cooperation but identifies cultural 
aspects as threats. Mostly, his evaluation is based on the cultural elements which 
according to him will provide spread of depravity in Georgians. The other 
interviewee states that “some churchmen tell their perish that the EU will provide 
us with depravity and mental illness, but this is definitely incorrect remark, 
propaganda of such viewpoints is should be avoided.” In addition, one of the 
respondents, who also is the longtime member of the Holy Synod says that “such 
discussion has never taken place in Holy Synod. Romania, Bulgaria and Greece are 
members of the EU and I have never heard that depravity or anything like that is 
becoming widespread since they are members of the EU.” One of the churchmen 
emphasize that more economic relation and less cultural proximity is not the shared 
belief within the GOC: “Maybe there are members who radically oppose close 
cultural relations with the EU, but they are not influential enough to affect on the 
general GOC attitude regarding the EU-Georgia relations.  I and the churchmen 
with whom I have contacts like the values on which the EU stands. It stands on the 
Christian values, equality, human rights and etc. If Georgia reaches such condition 
as soon as possible, we (the GOC) always welcome such a good trend of 
development.”   
The answers on the question which foreign policy direction is better for the 
future development of Georgia, were quite similar to each other. Only one 
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respondent took a neutral position because of the following reason: “when 
considering the choice related to the foreign policy, I think that we should not make 
a decision promptly, we have to scrutinize the pros and cons of each choice. 
According to the history of our country, we almost always were surrounded by 
empires, Ottoman empire, Persian empire, Russian empire, and etc. Because of this 
reason, we always needed to implement policies which were in accordance with the 
interests of one of the empires. In that way, we survived and still exist today. 
According to the current situation, we have to consider our history while making a 
decision. I was born and grown up in communist regime and I do not remember 
anything significant (in a positive way) Russia did for Georgia, the same happens 
in case of the EU. I rather prefer to keep neutral position in a current situation, try 
to have good relations with every international actor, otherwise, if we make a 
radical choice, then with the high probability, we will pay the cost. Moreover, such 
choice may lead us to deadlock.” The rest 10 agree on the current political course 
of Georgia – the European Integration. They mentioned that we have historical 
experience what Russia did to us, how it destroyed our state system and occupied 
our regions. In addition, they underlined that the EU membership will be the 
opportunity for development. Although, five of them choose the pro-EU way 
because of the existing circumstances. In particular, they mentioned that the 
neutrality is the ideal way, but at the same time these interviewees emphasized that 
having a model of Switzerland is utopia and impossible to implement in Georgia. 
According to one of these respondents “we (the country) have two options, take a 
pro-Russian way or pro-EU way. In between of these alternatives, I definitely 
support pro-EU approach, because what we remember form Russia is wars and 
bombs, this is the state which wants disappearance of Georgia, of course we have 
to try to improve our relations with Russia, but it should not be our first strategic 
partner.” Another respondent stressed that 20% of the territory of Georgia is 
occupied by Russia, but this should not cause hatred towards Russia: “We have to 
try and solve these problems in a peaceful manner, dialog between these conflicting 
parties is necessary but this should not become the ground for revision of Georgia’s 
main foreign policy direction and softening of pro-EU position. I definitely think 
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that maintaining the European way is critically important.” One of the archpriests 
states the following: “generally, making a strategic decision about the foreign 
policy is difficult and quite challenging. But, in case of Georgia, we should take 
into consideration that Russia did lots of damage to Georgia in material, territorial 
and even, despite the fact that we have ‘same-faith,’ the spiritual loss. In my 
opinion, the best way in the current situation is to strive for the full membership of 
the EU and to try to have balance relation with Russia. In addition, the membership 
of the EU should have the following clause, having the autonomy in cultural terms.”  
The rest five interviewees completely support the integration of Georgia in 
the EU. One of them says that the symbol of development for him is Europe 
(meaning the EU) and “if we want to choose and then follow the way of progress, 
we have to make a choice in favor of the EU.” The other churchmen states, “I have 
heard quite often when people, including churchmen, say that Georgia and Russia 
have the ‘same-faith’ and at least because of this reason the government should take 
the stance which is not in contradiction with Russia’s interest. I think that the ‘same-
faith’ issue should not be identified as determinant in choosing the foreign policy. 
Yes, we have the ‘same-faith’ but at the same time, ‘the deeds speak for the faith’ 
and from the actions of Russia we have got a huge damage. To my mind, the EU is 
a possibility to develop, also improve the quality of the safety within the country 
and be more secured from external threats.” One of the respondents argues that 
“pro-Russian course will impede the development of the country, we have to follow 
the current pro-EU approach but, also try to solve conflict with Russia by applying 
peaceful methods. I think that for the EU, to expand and accept a new member, 
which has territorial conflicts with its neighbor and does not try to solve it with the 
internationally recognized peaceful principles, will not be acceptable.” One of the 
archpriest says: “Russia had supremacy over Georgia for almost two centuries, and 
still parts of the territories of Georgia are occupied by the Russian Federation and 
its military forces are located there. In this difficult situation, we have to manage 
and maintain our strategic foreign policy aim, membership of the EU. In addition, 
we (Georgia), should have dialogue with Russia and they have to realize that 
Georgia is a sovereign state with its national interest. We do not aspire the EU 
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membership because of obsession, we have this goal because we want progress, 
development and state institutions in the EU is developed, the rule of law is ensured, 
human rights are protected and etc. Such phenomena are not common in Russia, 
therefore pro-Russian position would be the steps back on the way of development.“ 
On the last question, what additional issues can be identified which are 
unacceptable from the EU values, the absolute majority of the respondents answer 
that they do not have other remarks, some of them say that they are not fully aware 
of every aspect of the EU-Georgia relations, but based on existing knowledge there 
are not more issues which may become unacceptable for the GOC and also for them. 
As, one of the respondents suggests: “we are obliged to meet the requirements of 
the EU in order to deepen and intensify our relations and as far as I understand these 
issues, there are not anything which can be unacceptable for the GOC.” The only 
one respondent, who point out the additional unacceptable aspect, notes that in 
some cases the organizations, which in his words intentionally implement the anti-
GOC propaganda in Georgia, are financed from the EU institution and/or 
institutions of the EU member states, and this trend is unacceptable for him, “these 
organizations (locals) build their work on hatred and insults, they are subjective and 
do not reflect the reality. As in some cases they are financed from the EU/member 
states institutions, the general image of the EU is negatively affected.”  
Summary of the Interview Results 
From the conducted interviews, 10 respondents support integration of 
Georgia to the EU. Majority of them note that the European Union is the 
opportunity for the development of the country. Regarding Russia, the respondents 
recall historical examples how Russia harmed Georgia, not only to the state as a 
whole, but also to the Georgian Orthodox Church. 
Only one respondent showed neutral position and did not support neither 
aspirations to Europe nor having the pro-Russian politics.  
Despite the fact that the majority of the respondents wish Georgia to become 
the member of the EU, their choice is due to not only the attractiveness of the 
European Union but also to the current political developments. For example, 4 
respondents argue that neutrality is the best choice for Georgia, but they also note 
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that this is utopia in the current circumstances, therefore two alternatives remain: 
European Union or Russia. And, finally, among these two choices they shift to the 
EU.  
One of the supporters of the European integration emphasizes the 
importance of preserving cultural autonomy on the way to the EU. 
Generally, results of the interview show that LGBT issues are the most 
painful and alarming because they see the threat of demanding same-sex marriage 
right in the context of the LGBT rights. In their opinion, all this will be spoiling the 
society. 
Similarly to the GOC, the respondents see threats of propaganda in the anti-
discrimination law, “I and Society” and the May 17th developments. Therefore, 
they perceive their criticism as the act of opposition against immorality and sin.  
As for the pro-Russian sentiments, none of the respondents have expressed 
such affiliation. Although, this does not mean the absence of the pro-Russian 
members in the GOC.  
As noted by several respondents, within the GOC members roughly 50% 
support pro-EU foreign policy, while the other 50% has pro-Russian stance. And, 
one of the interviewees, argued that even more than half of the GOC members were 
pro-Russian. According to the other respondent, such differentiation is the result of 
discussions which is a democratic process. Another explanation was given by one 
interviewee who argued that one of the reasons for radical opposition of some GOC 
members to the EU is lack of awareness about this organization and because most 
of them received education and have strong personal links in Russia.  
Overall, based on the evidence, it can be argued that among churchmen there 
is no homogenous attitude either towards the EU or Russia. In addition, from the 
responses of the interviewees, a discursive pattern can be identified that in the GOC 
members, supporters to the pro-EU and pro-Russian foreign policy are equal, 
roughly 50%-50%. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the conducted research discussed the paradox that support to 
the EU in public is high, the GOC is an influential and the most trusted by Georgian 
population, but it is presented in academic literature as anti-EU institution. At the 
same time, there are examples which show pro-EU attitude of the GOC. 
Considering these controversies, this research aimed to figure out what kind of 
discourse the GOC articulates towards the EU and what kind of discourse prevails 
among its members. In order to answer these research questions, the discourse 
analysis of the statements, interviews and public speeches of the Patriarch Illia II 
and official statements of the GOC was applied. In addition, interviews with the 
GOC members were conducted to find out the ongoing internal discourse. Since 
anti-discrimination law, draft program of the school subject “I and Society”, the 
Self-Government code and the 17th of May developments were highly debatable 
issues in the country and position of the GOC was represented regarding these 
issues as the anti-EU, the data was collected mainly according to these topics.  
Taking into account experience of the Greek Orthodox Church, particularly, 
internal and external discourses of its Archbishop Christodoulos about the EU 
(discussed in more detail in the introductory part), similar binary approach might 
have taken by the GOC in Georgia. In other words, the Patriarchate may have 
praised the EU outside the country, especially in Europe, while articulating more 
conservative discourse inside Georgia by evaluating the EU values as the source of 
depravity and in this way mimicking the discourse prevailed in Russia. This is why 
topics which are labeled as pro-Russian in the media and academic sources were 
reviewed in this research as well.  
From the logic of Constructivism discussed in the theoretical part of this 
thesis, the GOC is an institution which represents an ‘agent’. And the action of an 
agent has an influence on another agent its behavior. Therefore, as the GOC as an 
‘agent’ has high trust rankings in the population and absolute majority of the 
Georgians are Orthodox Christians, it is capable of influencing another ‘agent’ - the 
government through the voters/ population. It is also evident that the government 
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recognizes the influential role of the GOC the demonstration of which are seminars 
and meetings jointly organized by the governmental as well as non-governmental 
institutions in order to enhance the awareness of the GOC about the benefits of the 
pro-Western foreign policy of the country and the EU as a whole. In addition, the 
role of the GOC was also recognized by the EU as well, when the high hierarchs of 
the Patriarchate of Georgia were recently invited in Brussels to discuss the 
importance of the EU-Georgia rapprochement. These meetings can be regarded as 
the clear demonstration that both the EU and Georgia recognize significance of the 
religious discursive context of the European Union.  
As the result of analysis was found that the GOC discourse towards the EU, 
both inside and outside the country, is fairly positive. Though, in regard of the 
LGBT rights, it maintains its conservative discourse - emphasizes and preserves 
traditional family values. But, as demonstrated by the examples of the other 
countries which represent the members of the EU, criticism to LGBT issues does 
not necessarily make an institution as anti-EU.  
As for the interview results, it is obvious that the discourse towards the EU 
is heterogeneous among the members of the GOC, but it can be argued that 
prevailing discourse is pro-EU. The logic is that despite heterogeneity, the pro-EU 
discourse is articulated on the official level. Thus, those members which support 
Georgia’s European path, seem to be more influential in the Patriarchate. It should 
be noted that this thesis did not intend to elaborate the later statement, though it was 
identified as a pattern and can be further researched in the future works to find the 
link between influence of the GOC members and the official discourses of the 
institution. In addition to the general pro-Eu discourse, the internal prevailing 
discourse does not differ from the official discourse of the GOC, as it also opposes 
implementation of the LGBT rights to marriage, to hold a parade and promotion of 
their lifestyle as normal.  
In relation to the Normative Power Europe, as the GOC supports the 
European choice of Georgia and the only thing is uncovered unacceptable is the 
LGBT issues, it can be argued that the GOC does not represent the challenge for 
spreading the EU’s normative power. In the interviews, as well, the respondents 
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noted that they appreciate the values on which the EU is based. Despite the fact that 
Manners is not explicit what kind of criteria should be met in order to identify an 
actor as the receiver of the Normative Power Europe, from the results of this study 
can be concluded that, to a large extent (in not completely), the Church recognizes 
the importance of the realization of the EU norms and values in Georgia in order to 
become the full member of this institution as defined by the foreign policy agenda. 
In other words, the logic behind the EU membership is to meet certain requirements 
of sharing the values and norms of the Union, and by supporting the 
Europeanization of Georgia the GOC approves needs of norm-taking. 
Regarding the contribution of this dissertation, at the general level, it 
enriches the academic literature about Georgia’s Europeanisation by engaging the 
religious factor as the unit of analysis. Also, the results support the theoretical 
argument about the influential role of religion on the politics and reaffirm the 
importance of studying the religious discursive context in assessing the EU as a 
Normative Power. In addition, the dissertation shows how the European integration 
process is viewed from the religious angle. It also represents a good basis for the 
future research to study the reasons for such discourses in the GOC, in other words 
to move from the ‘what’ question to ‘why’. Another important advantage of this 
study is that it can also contribute to the methodological approach of researching 
the GOC discourse among the GOC members. More specifically, as noted by one 
of the respondents, in order to conduct more in-depth study, Heads of the Eparchies 
should be interviewed, because the churchmen serving in a particular Eparchy, to a 
large extent, share the attitude of the Head.  
In terms of the limitations, the most important deficiency of this thesis is the 
inability to engage those members of the GOC which are known for their pro-
Russian and anti-EU sentiments. As already mentioned in the methodological part, 
they refused to the interviews for unspecified reasons and lack of time. In this 
respect, can be suggested to do a field research by attending the services and 
preaches of such churchmen in order to identify their discourses.  
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Annex 1 
Interview Questions 
1. In your opinion, what kind of discourse the GOC has towards the EU? In 
other words, to what extent the GOC supports foreign policy goal of 
Georgia, to become a full member of the EU? (What is your personal 
opinion? Do you agree with the current approach?) 
2. In your opinion, are the reforms implemented by the state institutions since 
2012 (for example: anti-discrimination law, the law on local self-
government) executed in order to get closer to the EU in political, economic 
and social terms following the further integration and full membership of 
the EU, or they are implemented because of the government’s willingness 
to improve the quality of governance? 
3. Do you think that the adoption of the law about the elimination of all forms 
of discrimination is a positive step from the government?  
a. What do you think, is this law acceptable for Georgian society? 
b. Do you wish to support some amendments in this law? 
4. The development of the 17th of May was evaluated in mass media and other 
sources as the restriction of freedom of expression (10th article of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms) from members of the GOC. In your opinion, in what 
circumstances freedom of expression can be restricted?  
a. Is there any consensus in the GOC about this issue? 
5. The Ministry of Education of Georgia is planning to introduce a new course 
at schools, “I and Society.” The GOC presented remarks about this subject, 
in your opinion is teaching this subject at schools a threat of degeneration 
for pupils or should it be taught only after making certain amendments (for 
example, according to remarks presented by the GOC)? 
6. In your own view, does the GOC support strong economic relations between the 
EU and Georgia while considering some elements of cultural proximity as a threat 
for Georgian society? 
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7. In general, which foreign policy direction is better for the development of 
Georgia, pro-European, pro-Russian or neutral?  
8. What issues can you figure out which are unacceptable from the European 
values? 
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